Claudio Katz, Dependency Theory after Fifty Years: The Continuing Relevance of Latin American Critical Thought, Haymarket Books, 2022. Pbk 2023 £17.99.
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It is good to be reminded of the vitality of dependency theory in its heyday, and for that reason alone this retrospective review (first published in Spanish in 2018) is welcome. Unfortunately, it is the only reason. Katz's reading of Marx is wrong, his understanding of the dynamics of global capitalism is inadequate, and he makes the elementary mistake of situating dependency theory in the broader tradition of theories of imperialism (of course, a necessary move) as if related theoretical literatures could be treated and understood without close attention to the specific circumstances from which particular contributions emerged. He does not address either the national situations or the broader regional and global contexts on which 'dependency theory' emerged or the specific points at issue, most notably in the latter case in relation to Brazil before and after the military coup of 1964. As a result, his analysis is completely unreliable. The short version, then, is that you would be well advised to leave this book aside, and read Gabriel Palma’s much earlier and immeasurably better review of ‘dependency theory’ instead (Palma 1978). Palma's essay hinges on Lenin's dictum that Characteristically, Katz is unaware of it.
Katz champions the analysis of 'sub-imperialism' associated with Rui Mauro Marini and Theotonio dos Santos, and is hostile, for different reasons, to Andre Gunder Frank on the one hand and Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the other, which is a preference, rather than a fault. his account of the theorists he dislikes is superficial and ill-informed
First, then, Katz's reading of Marx is perversely one-sided. He is described in the first chapter as moving from an initial conviction that the capitalist mode of production would become universal and that Western colonial rule could therefore be a progressive force despite the violence and criminality that attended it to a repudiation of colonialism, reinterpreted as a practice that created a hierarchical world market along centre-periphery lines. As Katz states, this argument is not new. Suniti Kumar Ghosh, for example, put it like this four decades ago:
'It is evident that Marx [outgrew] his earlier optimism about the revolutionary role of British colonial rule. He came to hold that far from laying down the material premises of a capitalist society, the colonial rule destroyed much of the existing productive forces, retarded the development of new ones, flung India backward and laid the basis of its underdevelopment. Instead of promoting the development of new productive forces, it tied India to the world market as a "chiefly agricultural field"; instead of the railways serving as the forerunner of modern industry, they proved to be a means of converting India into an agricultural appendage of Britain and a market for its industrial goods' (Ghosh 1985: 99-100; cf. Ghosh 1984).
So far, so good. For Ghosh, this is the prelude to an examination of the character of the Indian bourgeoisie. In Katz's hands, in contrast, it is the basis for an interpretation of a 'first' Marx who thought in terms of capitalism becoming universal, and a 'second' Marx who abandoned a concern for the 'generic tendencies of the world market', to focus instead on 'specific analyses of accumulation on a national scale':
'In his earlier stage, Marx emphasized the objective dynamics of capitalist development as a process of absorption of previous forms of production, focusing on the role of the productive forces as the paramount determinants of the course of history. As a result, he assumed that as capitalism developed it would incorporate the periphery into the mainstream of civilization. In his second period, Marx abandoned the idea of a passive molding of the colonial world into capitalist transformation. ... [A] unilinear philosophy based on the behavior of the forces of production was replaced by a multilinear view that highlighted the transformative role of subjects. ... As his research on capitalism advanced, he replaced his presentation of the generic tendencies of the world market with specific analyses of accumulation on a national scale. ... When Marx stated that "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future" he was alluding to these types [Western Europe, North America, Japan, (?) Russia] of equivalent economies. He did not extend this leveling to the periphery; he was referring to an evolution between peers or a movement toward that leveling' (7-8, 9-10).
This is about as wrong as a reading of Marx could be. He was not a theorist of core-periphery relations, or of varieties of national capitalist development, and Katz's attribution of these traits to his mature work betrays a larger failure that has direct consequences for his take on dependency theory. It is not just that he has no basis for asserting that the statement (in the 1867 preface to the first (German) edition of Capital) that the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future was applicable only to a set of 'core economies'; the larger problem is that he ignores the explicit context in which it is set:
'What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production and forms of intercourse (Verkehrsverhältnisse) that correspond to it. Until now, their locus classicus has been England. This is the reason why England is used as the main illustration of the theoretical developments I make. If, however, the German reader pharisaically shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural workers, or optimistically comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him: "De te fabula narratur"!
Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that spring from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies winning their way through and working themselves out with iron necessity. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future' (Capital, Vol. 1, Penguin, 1976, pp. 90-91, emphasis mine).
As this shows, Marx does not start with countries, whether independent or subject to colonial rule, but with the 'natural laws of capitalist production', and the social antagonisms that spring from them, these latter centred on the struggle between the minority who own the means of production and the great majority who do not, and so must live from their capacity to work. Capitalists, in competition with each other, are driven to reduce the cost of labour and/or increase its productivity, come up with new products, and develop new markets. And from this comes in turn the constant development of the world market, and the tendency for capital to penetrate and take over other existing areas of production, whether 'pre-capitalist' or household-based. Marx never abandons this perspective, which is perfectly compatible with the observation that in territories controlled by a foreign power the process of accumulation may be distorted, the 'circuit of capital' limited or incomplete, and so on. It is equally compatible with variations in the starting point, the character of the working class, and the specific trajectory of development in individual countries. Germany, the focus of attention here for obvious reasons, 'just like the rest of Continental Western Europe, [suffers] not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside the modern evils, we are oppressed by a whole series of inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of archaic and outmoded modes of production, with their accompanying train of anachronistic social and political relations. We suffer not only from the living, but the dead. Le mort saisit le vif! (ibid: 91).
In short, Marx offers a scenario that Katz is unable to grasp, in which capitalism inevitably develops on a global scale, while different local conditions produce varying local effects:
'Let us not deceive ourselves about this. Just as in the eighteenth century the American War of Independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so in the nineteenth century the American Civil War did the same for the European working class. In England the process of transformation is palpably evident. When it has reached a certain point, it must react on the Continent. There it will take a form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of development of the working class itself. Apart from any higher motives, then, the most basic interests of the present ruling classes dictate to them that they must clear out of the way all the legally removable obstacles to the development of the working class. ... One nation can and should learn from others. Even when a society has begun to track down the natural laws of its movement - and it is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society - it can neither leap over the natural phases of its development nor remove them by decree. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs' (ibid: 91-2).
Put at its simplest, this suggests that every ruling class is compelled, on pain of extinction, to develop its working class as a source of surplus value, but that it will inevitably have to do so it particular circumstances, not of its own choosing, that are to one degree or another adverse to the development of capitalist relations of production. As is evident, the argument of the Communist Manifesto is not abandoned here, but rather further extended. It is compatible with this perspective (echoed in successive prefaces/postfaces to subsequent editions of Capital) to suggest that this logic will not operate in colonial possessions, as the ruling imperial power will not be disposed or compelled to focus primarily on the full development of the colonial working class, and that it may indeed 'develop' that class as an adjunct to its own further capitalist development, as Ghosh argued and Katz agrees. But it is also consistent with the argument that as an imperial power comes under greater pressure as rival states emerge, it may find that a model of accumulation in part dependent on colonial exploitation restricts its ability to develop its domestic working class and to compete, condemning it to backwardness in some cases, giving rise in others to dwindling benefits, along with increasing costs arising from mounting nationalist opposition in the colonies themselves, and in every case creating a ruling class to some extent at odds with the imperatives of accumulation in accordance with the precepts of competitiveness. In every case, too, the end result is the loss in one way or another of imperialist rationale and/or imperial control, giving rise to independence sooner or later and more or less grudgingly or bitterly accepted. The trajectories of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English and French colonialism offer striking variations along these lines, while the late-nineteenth and twentieth-century cases of Germany and the United States offer different experiences again. In short, the framework sketched here suggests that the fortunes of newly created or newly independent states will depend upon the ability of their ruling classes to develop their working class in conditions of increasing global competitiveness; and this suggests in turn that it is fundamentally wrong to take a core-periphery division as permanent, or make a primary distinction between 'core' and 'dependent' states.
I cannot express the implications for 'dependency theory' better than I did 35 years ago:
'The Marxist texts to which one should turn in the first instance are those in which Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci sought to arrive at an understanding of the process of social and political change in their own countries. Although some of these texts are occasional pieces, they reveal a deeper knowledge and reflection than some of the writings to which it is conventional to turn for clues to an approach to an understanding of the impact of capitalism in the periphery. Equally, they represent attempts to apply Marxist categories to the analysis of specific national cases and circumstances, and to this extent are directly comparable with Latin American dependency writing. ... They show how specific features such as international political and economic context and local peculiarities of class formation and patterns of class conflict and alliance are incorporated into a single coherent analysis; they also touch interestingly upon the state as the locus of implementation of projects of class rule. Finally, they examine the "developing societies" of their day, raising the question of whether they could be expected to follow paths similar to those traced out by the core capitalist countries of their times' (Cammack 1988: 93-4).
The texts I drew on there - Engels' 'The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party' (1865), Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution, and Gramsci's Notes on Italian History and Aspects of the Southern Question (to which today I would add Americanism and Fordism) all focus on the question of the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to carry out a 'bourgeois revolution' and establish the capitalist mode of production. This not a path that Katz takes. His focus is instead on core-periphery relations, first through the writings of Lenin, Trotsky and Luxemburg, then through Paul Baron and Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin and Ernest Mandel. The result is that when he finally turns to dependency theory (Chapter 4, 59-75) he does so with no introductory discussion of Latin America's core-periphery status, colonial and post-colonial history, and nineteenth and twentieth century patterns of integration into the world market. He begins instead with the suggestion that: 'The Marxist Theory of Dependency was a direct product of the Cuban revolution' (59) - a dubious assertion, but one that if advanced seriously would require some comparative discussion of Cuba's quite distinctive mode of insertion into the global economy following its trajectory of slave-based sugar production, late independence, and US occupation, the significance of its semi-proletarianised peasantry, the implications of all this for the politics and dynamics of the revolution itself, and a careful examination of its impact across the region. In short, Katz detaches Latin American dependency theory/critical thought from the Latin American political economy that is its point of reference.
In fact, if we leave aside for the moment Andre Gunder Frank's spirited attack on modernisation theory, which was sui generis, the national experience that was at the heart of 'dependency theory' was that of Brazil, and key event was not the Cuban Revolution, but the military coup that ousted the government of João Goulart there in 1964. Of fundamental importance, the focus of debate was the capacity, or lack of it, of the Brazilian bourgeoisie to lead a progressive alliance with the working class. So, Cardoso' early work was on ethnicity and slavery in Brazil, and the distinctive form of capitalism to which it gave rise (1960, 1962), and he went on from there to address directly the capacity of the Brazilian bourgeoisie to lead the process of capitalist development (1964). Katz has read none of this work, nor his later analyses of the conjuncture arising in Brazil from the 1964 coup (Cardoso, 1972). He is more familiar with Marini's work, but, crucially, not with his lengthy post-coup analysis of the 'dialectics of capitalist development in Brazil' (Marini, 1996).
Cammack, Paul. 1988. 'Dependency and the Politics of Development', in P.F. Leeson and M.M. Minogue, eds, Perspectives on Development, Manchester University Press, pp. 89-125.
Cammack, Paul. 1991. 'Brazil: The Long March to the New Republic', New Left Review, 190, November-December, pp. 21-58.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1960. Cor e mobilidade social em Florianopolis. São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1962. Capitalismo e escravidão no Brasil meridional. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1964. Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico no Brasil. São Paulo, DIFEL.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar.
Ghosh, Suniti Kumar. 1984. Marx on India, Monthly Review, 35, 8, 39-53.
Ghosh, Suniti Kumar. 1985. The Indian Big Bourgeoisie: Its Genesis, Growth and Character, Calcutta.
Marini, Ruy Mauro. 1966. ‘La dialéctica del desarrollo capitalista en Brasil’, in Carlos Eduardo Martins, ed, Ruy Mauro Marini: America Latina, dependencia y globalizacion, CLACSO/Siglo XXI, 2015, pp. 25-106 (original text available at https://www.marxists.info/portugues/marini/1985/mes/Dialetica-do-desenvolvimento-capitalista-no-Brasil.pdf
Martins, Carlos Eduardo, ed. 2015. Ruy Mauro Marini: America Latina, dependencia y globalizacion, CLACSO/Siglo XXI, 2015.
Palma, Gabriel. 1978. ‘Dependency: A Formal Theory of Development or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Systems of Underdevelopment?’, World Development, 6, 881-924.
Katz champions the analysis of 'sub-imperialism' associated with Rui Mauro Marini and Theotonio dos Santos, and is hostile, for different reasons, to Andre Gunder Frank on the one hand and Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the other, which is a preference, rather than a fault. his account of the theorists he dislikes is superficial and ill-informed
First, then, Katz's reading of Marx is perversely one-sided. He is described in the first chapter as moving from an initial conviction that the capitalist mode of production would become universal and that Western colonial rule could therefore be a progressive force despite the violence and criminality that attended it to a repudiation of colonialism, reinterpreted as a practice that created a hierarchical world market along centre-periphery lines. As Katz states, this argument is not new. Suniti Kumar Ghosh, for example, put it like this four decades ago:
'It is evident that Marx [outgrew] his earlier optimism about the revolutionary role of British colonial rule. He came to hold that far from laying down the material premises of a capitalist society, the colonial rule destroyed much of the existing productive forces, retarded the development of new ones, flung India backward and laid the basis of its underdevelopment. Instead of promoting the development of new productive forces, it tied India to the world market as a "chiefly agricultural field"; instead of the railways serving as the forerunner of modern industry, they proved to be a means of converting India into an agricultural appendage of Britain and a market for its industrial goods' (Ghosh 1985: 99-100; cf. Ghosh 1984).
So far, so good. For Ghosh, this is the prelude to an examination of the character of the Indian bourgeoisie. In Katz's hands, in contrast, it is the basis for an interpretation of a 'first' Marx who thought in terms of capitalism becoming universal, and a 'second' Marx who abandoned a concern for the 'generic tendencies of the world market', to focus instead on 'specific analyses of accumulation on a national scale':
'In his earlier stage, Marx emphasized the objective dynamics of capitalist development as a process of absorption of previous forms of production, focusing on the role of the productive forces as the paramount determinants of the course of history. As a result, he assumed that as capitalism developed it would incorporate the periphery into the mainstream of civilization. In his second period, Marx abandoned the idea of a passive molding of the colonial world into capitalist transformation. ... [A] unilinear philosophy based on the behavior of the forces of production was replaced by a multilinear view that highlighted the transformative role of subjects. ... As his research on capitalism advanced, he replaced his presentation of the generic tendencies of the world market with specific analyses of accumulation on a national scale. ... When Marx stated that "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future" he was alluding to these types [Western Europe, North America, Japan, (?) Russia] of equivalent economies. He did not extend this leveling to the periphery; he was referring to an evolution between peers or a movement toward that leveling' (7-8, 9-10).
This is about as wrong as a reading of Marx could be. He was not a theorist of core-periphery relations, or of varieties of national capitalist development, and Katz's attribution of these traits to his mature work betrays a larger failure that has direct consequences for his take on dependency theory. It is not just that he has no basis for asserting that the statement (in the 1867 preface to the first (German) edition of Capital) that the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future was applicable only to a set of 'core economies'; the larger problem is that he ignores the explicit context in which it is set:
'What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production and forms of intercourse (Verkehrsverhältnisse) that correspond to it. Until now, their locus classicus has been England. This is the reason why England is used as the main illustration of the theoretical developments I make. If, however, the German reader pharisaically shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural workers, or optimistically comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him: "De te fabula narratur"!
Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that spring from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies winning their way through and working themselves out with iron necessity. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future' (Capital, Vol. 1, Penguin, 1976, pp. 90-91, emphasis mine).
As this shows, Marx does not start with countries, whether independent or subject to colonial rule, but with the 'natural laws of capitalist production', and the social antagonisms that spring from them, these latter centred on the struggle between the minority who own the means of production and the great majority who do not, and so must live from their capacity to work. Capitalists, in competition with each other, are driven to reduce the cost of labour and/or increase its productivity, come up with new products, and develop new markets. And from this comes in turn the constant development of the world market, and the tendency for capital to penetrate and take over other existing areas of production, whether 'pre-capitalist' or household-based. Marx never abandons this perspective, which is perfectly compatible with the observation that in territories controlled by a foreign power the process of accumulation may be distorted, the 'circuit of capital' limited or incomplete, and so on. It is equally compatible with variations in the starting point, the character of the working class, and the specific trajectory of development in individual countries. Germany, the focus of attention here for obvious reasons, 'just like the rest of Continental Western Europe, [suffers] not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside the modern evils, we are oppressed by a whole series of inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of archaic and outmoded modes of production, with their accompanying train of anachronistic social and political relations. We suffer not only from the living, but the dead. Le mort saisit le vif! (ibid: 91).
In short, Marx offers a scenario that Katz is unable to grasp, in which capitalism inevitably develops on a global scale, while different local conditions produce varying local effects:
'Let us not deceive ourselves about this. Just as in the eighteenth century the American War of Independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so in the nineteenth century the American Civil War did the same for the European working class. In England the process of transformation is palpably evident. When it has reached a certain point, it must react on the Continent. There it will take a form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of development of the working class itself. Apart from any higher motives, then, the most basic interests of the present ruling classes dictate to them that they must clear out of the way all the legally removable obstacles to the development of the working class. ... One nation can and should learn from others. Even when a society has begun to track down the natural laws of its movement - and it is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society - it can neither leap over the natural phases of its development nor remove them by decree. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs' (ibid: 91-2).
Put at its simplest, this suggests that every ruling class is compelled, on pain of extinction, to develop its working class as a source of surplus value, but that it will inevitably have to do so it particular circumstances, not of its own choosing, that are to one degree or another adverse to the development of capitalist relations of production. As is evident, the argument of the Communist Manifesto is not abandoned here, but rather further extended. It is compatible with this perspective (echoed in successive prefaces/postfaces to subsequent editions of Capital) to suggest that this logic will not operate in colonial possessions, as the ruling imperial power will not be disposed or compelled to focus primarily on the full development of the colonial working class, and that it may indeed 'develop' that class as an adjunct to its own further capitalist development, as Ghosh argued and Katz agrees. But it is also consistent with the argument that as an imperial power comes under greater pressure as rival states emerge, it may find that a model of accumulation in part dependent on colonial exploitation restricts its ability to develop its domestic working class and to compete, condemning it to backwardness in some cases, giving rise in others to dwindling benefits, along with increasing costs arising from mounting nationalist opposition in the colonies themselves, and in every case creating a ruling class to some extent at odds with the imperatives of accumulation in accordance with the precepts of competitiveness. In every case, too, the end result is the loss in one way or another of imperialist rationale and/or imperial control, giving rise to independence sooner or later and more or less grudgingly or bitterly accepted. The trajectories of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English and French colonialism offer striking variations along these lines, while the late-nineteenth and twentieth-century cases of Germany and the United States offer different experiences again. In short, the framework sketched here suggests that the fortunes of newly created or newly independent states will depend upon the ability of their ruling classes to develop their working class in conditions of increasing global competitiveness; and this suggests in turn that it is fundamentally wrong to take a core-periphery division as permanent, or make a primary distinction between 'core' and 'dependent' states.
I cannot express the implications for 'dependency theory' better than I did 35 years ago:
'The Marxist texts to which one should turn in the first instance are those in which Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci sought to arrive at an understanding of the process of social and political change in their own countries. Although some of these texts are occasional pieces, they reveal a deeper knowledge and reflection than some of the writings to which it is conventional to turn for clues to an approach to an understanding of the impact of capitalism in the periphery. Equally, they represent attempts to apply Marxist categories to the analysis of specific national cases and circumstances, and to this extent are directly comparable with Latin American dependency writing. ... They show how specific features such as international political and economic context and local peculiarities of class formation and patterns of class conflict and alliance are incorporated into a single coherent analysis; they also touch interestingly upon the state as the locus of implementation of projects of class rule. Finally, they examine the "developing societies" of their day, raising the question of whether they could be expected to follow paths similar to those traced out by the core capitalist countries of their times' (Cammack 1988: 93-4).
The texts I drew on there - Engels' 'The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party' (1865), Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia and Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution, and Gramsci's Notes on Italian History and Aspects of the Southern Question (to which today I would add Americanism and Fordism) all focus on the question of the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to carry out a 'bourgeois revolution' and establish the capitalist mode of production. This not a path that Katz takes. His focus is instead on core-periphery relations, first through the writings of Lenin, Trotsky and Luxemburg, then through Paul Baron and Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin and Ernest Mandel. The result is that when he finally turns to dependency theory (Chapter 4, 59-75) he does so with no introductory discussion of Latin America's core-periphery status, colonial and post-colonial history, and nineteenth and twentieth century patterns of integration into the world market. He begins instead with the suggestion that: 'The Marxist Theory of Dependency was a direct product of the Cuban revolution' (59) - a dubious assertion, but one that if advanced seriously would require some comparative discussion of Cuba's quite distinctive mode of insertion into the global economy following its trajectory of slave-based sugar production, late independence, and US occupation, the significance of its semi-proletarianised peasantry, the implications of all this for the politics and dynamics of the revolution itself, and a careful examination of its impact across the region. In short, Katz detaches Latin American dependency theory/critical thought from the Latin American political economy that is its point of reference.
In fact, if we leave aside for the moment Andre Gunder Frank's spirited attack on modernisation theory, which was sui generis, the national experience that was at the heart of 'dependency theory' was that of Brazil, and key event was not the Cuban Revolution, but the military coup that ousted the government of João Goulart there in 1964. Of fundamental importance, the focus of debate was the capacity, or lack of it, of the Brazilian bourgeoisie to lead a progressive alliance with the working class. So, Cardoso' early work was on ethnicity and slavery in Brazil, and the distinctive form of capitalism to which it gave rise (1960, 1962), and he went on from there to address directly the capacity of the Brazilian bourgeoisie to lead the process of capitalist development (1964). Katz has read none of this work, nor his later analyses of the conjuncture arising in Brazil from the 1964 coup (Cardoso, 1972). He is more familiar with Marini's work, but, crucially, not with his lengthy post-coup analysis of the 'dialectics of capitalist development in Brazil' (Marini, 1996).
Cammack, Paul. 1988. 'Dependency and the Politics of Development', in P.F. Leeson and M.M. Minogue, eds, Perspectives on Development, Manchester University Press, pp. 89-125.
Cammack, Paul. 1991. 'Brazil: The Long March to the New Republic', New Left Review, 190, November-December, pp. 21-58.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1960. Cor e mobilidade social em Florianopolis. São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1962. Capitalismo e escravidão no Brasil meridional. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1964. Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico no Brasil. São Paulo, DIFEL.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar.
Ghosh, Suniti Kumar. 1984. Marx on India, Monthly Review, 35, 8, 39-53.
Ghosh, Suniti Kumar. 1985. The Indian Big Bourgeoisie: Its Genesis, Growth and Character, Calcutta.
Marini, Ruy Mauro. 1966. ‘La dialéctica del desarrollo capitalista en Brasil’, in Carlos Eduardo Martins, ed, Ruy Mauro Marini: America Latina, dependencia y globalizacion, CLACSO/Siglo XXI, 2015, pp. 25-106 (original text available at https://www.marxists.info/portugues/marini/1985/mes/Dialetica-do-desenvolvimento-capitalista-no-Brasil.pdf
Martins, Carlos Eduardo, ed. 2015. Ruy Mauro Marini: America Latina, dependencia y globalizacion, CLACSO/Siglo XXI, 2015.
Palma, Gabriel. 1978. ‘Dependency: A Formal Theory of Development or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Systems of Underdevelopment?’, World Development, 6, 881-924.