Alexander Lukin, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement. Polity Press, 2018. Hbk £55, $69.95. Pbk £16.99, $24.95.
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RATING: 85
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Buy this book?
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Yes
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At a moment when the US is raising protective barriers against Chinese exports and thereby encouraging it to look elsewhere, and Western governments are expelling Russian diplomats in response to the attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal despite the absence of conclusive proof of official Russian involvement, the message of this book could not be more timely. It is that since 1991 Russia and China have been developing a close and wide-ranging strategic partnership, and that it has been accelerated and deepened since the West’s response to the Ukrainian crisis convinced even pro-Western Russian government and business elites that their future lay with Asia in general, and with Eurasia and China in particular. Aggressive moves from Obama and Hillary Clinton were already evidence of a plan to isolate and contain China, but Trump's declaration that China and Russia are 'revisionist' powers (in other words, united in a desire to overthrow the current international system and with it US global leadership), and the reorganisation of his administration that has most recently brought Bolton back to the position of national security adviser, could not have been better calculated to push the two into each other’s arms. Lukin provides a comprehensive review of Chinese-Russian relations, based on deep knowledge of sources in both languages. The book is essential reading, especially for readers in North America and Western Europe, and all the more so if, like me, you don't have the language skills to explore original sources yourself. It leaves me in no doubt that an irreversible shift has taken place, and that the clear potential exists not only for a new configuration of the global economy, but for a new Eurasian-centred world order. In the circumstances, the first response should not be a rush to moral judgement, but an effort to understand the historical, material, social and institutional forces that are pushing in this direction. Buy the book: it makes an excellent start.
Lukin’s account reflects the significant debate that takes place on foreign policy options in official and academic circles in both countries, and discriminates very carefully between sources that express the positions of the respective governments, and alternative views. For example, some in official circles in China still call for a policy of passivity towards international regimes (the strategy of 'keeping a low profile' adopted by Deng Xiaoping), while others call for a formal alliance with Russia, presumptively against the ‘unipolar’ United States. In contrast, the policy pursued by Xi Jinping is focused on playing an active role in international politics ('striving for achievement'), through the United Nations and its institutions, along with the long-established relationship of good neighbourliness and cooperation with Russia (formalised in a treaty in 2001), and the settled intention of not seeking a formal military alliance of any kind. For its part, although some in Russia call for confrontation with the West and some are strongly pro-European, Russia's 'pivot to Asia', which dates back to the last years of the Soviet Union, marks a significant shift but does not imply turning its back on Europe. Rather, the old coat of arms with the two headed eagle is said to signify a desire to 'look both ways', while developing an independent place in the world.
Both countries reject the efforts of the US to promote ‘democratism’ around the world, make it a point of principle not to promote their own political models or to accept critiques from outside, and consistently advocate recognition of a 'multipolar' world' grounded in UN institutions. They have not backed each other’s international actions uncritically but over Crimea and the South China Sea for example, where they have reservations they have abstained in the Security Council rather than condemn each other. Meanwhile, the identification of Eurasia as an area of intense shared strategic and economic interest has given them a strengthened commitment to developing their own bordering regions (the relatively neglected Siberia and Far Eastern territories in Russia, and the West of China), and to building good relations with neighbouring states.
The Ukrainian crisis is identified as a crucial turning point, as despite the long development of friendly relations with China, Russian business and government elites were wary of the greater strength and dynamism of the Chinese economy, and the difficulty of establishing an equal relationship in trade, investment, and technological exchange, and therefore held back from major commitments until 2014. After three introductory chapters (with excellent brief summaries of the main points, pp. 64-6, 94-5), Chapter 4 reviews the development of the strategic partnership through to the present, and Chapter 5 examines its key dimensions and recent institutionalisation in detail. The conclusion then addresses the focus on Asia and Greater Eurasia in the light of very recent developments, ending with a brief discussion of the implications of Trump’s presidency.
China accepted the ending of the communist regime in the Soviet Union without protest, and sought to maintain good relations after 1991, but the early 1990s were still marked by sharply differing foreign policy orientations, with China still under single party rule and shunned by the West despite its launching of a new push towards integration into the world market, while Russia under Yeltsin was at the peak of its commitment to 'full-fledged partnership and integration with the West' (72). Over the ensuing 25 years, that situation has been transformed, and one merit of Lukin's account is that it establishes just how deeply and broadly founded the new rapprochement between China and Russia is.
Under Yeltsin, Russian foreign policy was confused and unstable, with different messages emerging from time to time from Yeltsin himself and from other regions or branches of government, but no break with China took place. While President Bush Sr was celebrating the ‘unipolar moment’, China and Russia were engaged, despite the differences recently produced between their political systems, in agreeing joint statements of non first use of nuclear weapons, mutually de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles, and pledging to be ‘good and cooperative neighbours’ and friends. At the same time, they recognised each other as ‘powers which are a major factor of maintaining peace and stability under the situation of emerging polycentric international system (sic)’ (98). As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they declared themselves content with the post-World War II settlement, the UN system of international law, and the supreme authority of the Security Council (and hostile by extension to NATO action without UN backing). In 1996 they up-graded their relationship to an ‘equal and trustworthy partnership towards strategic interaction’, apparently as a result of an impromptu change of wording made by Yeltsin en route to Beijing, readily agreed on his arrival by Jiang Zemin (99-100). In 1997, the two leaders signed the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. At the same time, as they would reiterate in 1998 and have maintained ever since, their emerging strategic partnership ‘is not an alliance and is not aimed against third countries’ (100).
Before Putin came to power, then, the foundations had been laid for an approach to world order that in effect broke the link between the post WW2 system and US hegemony, ending the transitional phase marked by the latter. Putin moved quickly to formalize relations and develop them further, the result being the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. After a brief period following the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 it seemed that Russia might swing back towards the US, but the US war on Iraq, in the face of determined Chinese and Russian efforts to keep the focus on resolution through the UN, along with US measures against North Korea, pushed the two together again. Also crucial in the period, with an eye to the future development of the larger Eurasian area, was the 2005 Additional Agreement on the Eastern Part of the Russian-Chinese Border, which settled issues that had been outstanding for four decades.
Up until 2014, all the same, Putin sought to keep good relations with the West and the East, and as noted above remained wary of the possibility that China would dominate Russia if the two moved closer. But this balanced approach changed with the response of the West to the Ukrainian crisis, as the Russian elite took from it the message that ‘there was no alternative to intensified cooperation with Asia’ (89). The immediate response was a reawakened official interest in supporting Chinese studies, and a range of links with China. In particular, the Russian-Chinese Business Council was reinvigorated, and Chinese investors were allowed to buy shares in Russian oil and gas companies. A ‘pivot to China’ began, ‘based on cooperation on physical infrastructure and cultural and educational projects’, along with growing conviction among business and official elites that cooperation with the rest could not be fully restored (91). Significant pro-European interests and elites remain. But there are several reasons, Lukin concludes, that make it impossible for a return to the pre-Ukrainian state of affairs:
‘First, the widening contacts with China and other Asian states, as well as the new and profitable contracts with Chinese partners, are irreversible. Second, trust in Western partners has been undermined: there is nothing attractive about closing multimillion-dollar deals with companies in countries that do not hesitate to make political decisions which cause serious financial losses to overseas partners. Third, public opinion has passed the point of no return: the majority of Russia has learned to look at the US and the EU member states as enemies’ (93).
In institutional terms, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) slowly became a major forum with the potential to become a significant regional actor. In the first decade after its founding in 2001 its membership (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) remained constant, with no mechanism for admitting new members. Initiatives taken in 2010-11 then led eventually to the entry of India and Pakistan in 2017, with Iran a potential future member. ‘On the whole’, Lukin observes, ‘despite some teething problems, the SCO [which is thoroughly integrated into the UN system] is slowly but surely turning into a really functioning and authoritative international organization to be reckoned with, whether one likes it or not’ (125). With its new members, he adds, it ‘could be regarded as an emerging cornerstone of the multipolar world in the making, a platform offering a Eurasian alternative to Western Europe’ (126-7).
The highly informative final chapter (128-171) gives a comprehensive picture of the range, strength and depth of the strategic partnership between China and Russia. The respective presidents meet several times a year, as do other heads of government. Five permanent commissions (with 20 sub-commissions) work continuously, the latest being the Intergovernmental Commission for Investment Cooperation (2014), and the Commission for Cooperation and Development of Russia’s Far East and Baikal Region and Northeast China (2016). With Russian doubts about a whole-hearted commitment to cooperation across the board dispelled by the hostility of the West, there have been rapid moves towards close partnership in key strategic areas – defence and armaments, energy, trade and investment, and technology – and, crucially, close engagement from Russia in the Belt and Road Initiative (New Silk Road) launched by China in 2013. The signing by President Putin in May 2015 of the statement on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt (179) has led to a spate of further agreements since, signalling a joint effort to invest heavily in infrastructure and communications across the common Greater Eurasian space.
The world has changed. On any objective analysis, the ‘offer’ of international order coming from China and Russia is likely to prove attractive to other emerging economies – India, Pakistan, and Iran, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and others. It proposes commitment to the UN system, mutual respect for sovereignty and for different political regimes, and an accentuated emphasis on infrastructural investment and economic development in the context of multipolarity. Lukin’s conclusion is that Russia’s pivot to Asia is largely irreversible, and that the West should now abandon its attempt to play a dominant role in shaping general principles and rules of world order, ‘because its influence in world politics is clearly decreasing, even as that of other players is growing’ (190). It is hard to argue against it.
Lukin’s account reflects the significant debate that takes place on foreign policy options in official and academic circles in both countries, and discriminates very carefully between sources that express the positions of the respective governments, and alternative views. For example, some in official circles in China still call for a policy of passivity towards international regimes (the strategy of 'keeping a low profile' adopted by Deng Xiaoping), while others call for a formal alliance with Russia, presumptively against the ‘unipolar’ United States. In contrast, the policy pursued by Xi Jinping is focused on playing an active role in international politics ('striving for achievement'), through the United Nations and its institutions, along with the long-established relationship of good neighbourliness and cooperation with Russia (formalised in a treaty in 2001), and the settled intention of not seeking a formal military alliance of any kind. For its part, although some in Russia call for confrontation with the West and some are strongly pro-European, Russia's 'pivot to Asia', which dates back to the last years of the Soviet Union, marks a significant shift but does not imply turning its back on Europe. Rather, the old coat of arms with the two headed eagle is said to signify a desire to 'look both ways', while developing an independent place in the world.
Both countries reject the efforts of the US to promote ‘democratism’ around the world, make it a point of principle not to promote their own political models or to accept critiques from outside, and consistently advocate recognition of a 'multipolar' world' grounded in UN institutions. They have not backed each other’s international actions uncritically but over Crimea and the South China Sea for example, where they have reservations they have abstained in the Security Council rather than condemn each other. Meanwhile, the identification of Eurasia as an area of intense shared strategic and economic interest has given them a strengthened commitment to developing their own bordering regions (the relatively neglected Siberia and Far Eastern territories in Russia, and the West of China), and to building good relations with neighbouring states.
The Ukrainian crisis is identified as a crucial turning point, as despite the long development of friendly relations with China, Russian business and government elites were wary of the greater strength and dynamism of the Chinese economy, and the difficulty of establishing an equal relationship in trade, investment, and technological exchange, and therefore held back from major commitments until 2014. After three introductory chapters (with excellent brief summaries of the main points, pp. 64-6, 94-5), Chapter 4 reviews the development of the strategic partnership through to the present, and Chapter 5 examines its key dimensions and recent institutionalisation in detail. The conclusion then addresses the focus on Asia and Greater Eurasia in the light of very recent developments, ending with a brief discussion of the implications of Trump’s presidency.
China accepted the ending of the communist regime in the Soviet Union without protest, and sought to maintain good relations after 1991, but the early 1990s were still marked by sharply differing foreign policy orientations, with China still under single party rule and shunned by the West despite its launching of a new push towards integration into the world market, while Russia under Yeltsin was at the peak of its commitment to 'full-fledged partnership and integration with the West' (72). Over the ensuing 25 years, that situation has been transformed, and one merit of Lukin's account is that it establishes just how deeply and broadly founded the new rapprochement between China and Russia is.
Under Yeltsin, Russian foreign policy was confused and unstable, with different messages emerging from time to time from Yeltsin himself and from other regions or branches of government, but no break with China took place. While President Bush Sr was celebrating the ‘unipolar moment’, China and Russia were engaged, despite the differences recently produced between their political systems, in agreeing joint statements of non first use of nuclear weapons, mutually de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles, and pledging to be ‘good and cooperative neighbours’ and friends. At the same time, they recognised each other as ‘powers which are a major factor of maintaining peace and stability under the situation of emerging polycentric international system (sic)’ (98). As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they declared themselves content with the post-World War II settlement, the UN system of international law, and the supreme authority of the Security Council (and hostile by extension to NATO action without UN backing). In 1996 they up-graded their relationship to an ‘equal and trustworthy partnership towards strategic interaction’, apparently as a result of an impromptu change of wording made by Yeltsin en route to Beijing, readily agreed on his arrival by Jiang Zemin (99-100). In 1997, the two leaders signed the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. At the same time, as they would reiterate in 1998 and have maintained ever since, their emerging strategic partnership ‘is not an alliance and is not aimed against third countries’ (100).
Before Putin came to power, then, the foundations had been laid for an approach to world order that in effect broke the link between the post WW2 system and US hegemony, ending the transitional phase marked by the latter. Putin moved quickly to formalize relations and develop them further, the result being the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. After a brief period following the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 it seemed that Russia might swing back towards the US, but the US war on Iraq, in the face of determined Chinese and Russian efforts to keep the focus on resolution through the UN, along with US measures against North Korea, pushed the two together again. Also crucial in the period, with an eye to the future development of the larger Eurasian area, was the 2005 Additional Agreement on the Eastern Part of the Russian-Chinese Border, which settled issues that had been outstanding for four decades.
Up until 2014, all the same, Putin sought to keep good relations with the West and the East, and as noted above remained wary of the possibility that China would dominate Russia if the two moved closer. But this balanced approach changed with the response of the West to the Ukrainian crisis, as the Russian elite took from it the message that ‘there was no alternative to intensified cooperation with Asia’ (89). The immediate response was a reawakened official interest in supporting Chinese studies, and a range of links with China. In particular, the Russian-Chinese Business Council was reinvigorated, and Chinese investors were allowed to buy shares in Russian oil and gas companies. A ‘pivot to China’ began, ‘based on cooperation on physical infrastructure and cultural and educational projects’, along with growing conviction among business and official elites that cooperation with the rest could not be fully restored (91). Significant pro-European interests and elites remain. But there are several reasons, Lukin concludes, that make it impossible for a return to the pre-Ukrainian state of affairs:
‘First, the widening contacts with China and other Asian states, as well as the new and profitable contracts with Chinese partners, are irreversible. Second, trust in Western partners has been undermined: there is nothing attractive about closing multimillion-dollar deals with companies in countries that do not hesitate to make political decisions which cause serious financial losses to overseas partners. Third, public opinion has passed the point of no return: the majority of Russia has learned to look at the US and the EU member states as enemies’ (93).
In institutional terms, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) slowly became a major forum with the potential to become a significant regional actor. In the first decade after its founding in 2001 its membership (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) remained constant, with no mechanism for admitting new members. Initiatives taken in 2010-11 then led eventually to the entry of India and Pakistan in 2017, with Iran a potential future member. ‘On the whole’, Lukin observes, ‘despite some teething problems, the SCO [which is thoroughly integrated into the UN system] is slowly but surely turning into a really functioning and authoritative international organization to be reckoned with, whether one likes it or not’ (125). With its new members, he adds, it ‘could be regarded as an emerging cornerstone of the multipolar world in the making, a platform offering a Eurasian alternative to Western Europe’ (126-7).
The highly informative final chapter (128-171) gives a comprehensive picture of the range, strength and depth of the strategic partnership between China and Russia. The respective presidents meet several times a year, as do other heads of government. Five permanent commissions (with 20 sub-commissions) work continuously, the latest being the Intergovernmental Commission for Investment Cooperation (2014), and the Commission for Cooperation and Development of Russia’s Far East and Baikal Region and Northeast China (2016). With Russian doubts about a whole-hearted commitment to cooperation across the board dispelled by the hostility of the West, there have been rapid moves towards close partnership in key strategic areas – defence and armaments, energy, trade and investment, and technology – and, crucially, close engagement from Russia in the Belt and Road Initiative (New Silk Road) launched by China in 2013. The signing by President Putin in May 2015 of the statement on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt (179) has led to a spate of further agreements since, signalling a joint effort to invest heavily in infrastructure and communications across the common Greater Eurasian space.
The world has changed. On any objective analysis, the ‘offer’ of international order coming from China and Russia is likely to prove attractive to other emerging economies – India, Pakistan, and Iran, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and others. It proposes commitment to the UN system, mutual respect for sovereignty and for different political regimes, and an accentuated emphasis on infrastructural investment and economic development in the context of multipolarity. Lukin’s conclusion is that Russia’s pivot to Asia is largely irreversible, and that the West should now abandon its attempt to play a dominant role in shaping general principles and rules of world order, ‘because its influence in world politics is clearly decreasing, even as that of other players is growing’ (190). It is hard to argue against it.